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Efficiency and Effectiveness of Social Spending
*
 
In this qualitative sociological and quantitative economic policy paper, we start out from the 
assumption of a very recent European Commission Background paper on the “Efficiency and 
effectiveness of social spending”, which says the effectiveness of social spending can be 
defined by the degree to which the realized allocation approaches the socially desired 
outcome. The conclusions listed in the Commission paper are found far reaching and not 
supported by the empirical data. We perform such an analysis, starting from advances in 
recent literature. A more encompassing sociological perspective on the issue and factor 
analytical calculations is presented, which supports our general argument about the 
efficiency of the Scandinavian model. The social quality approach provides an alternative 
perspective on welfare system analysis, focusing on public policies rather than social 
policies. The empirical evidence, suggests that in terms of the efficiency of the European 
social model, the geography of comparative performance include: the direct action against 
social exclusion, health and family social expenditures, the neo-liberal approach, and the 
unemployment benefit centred approach. Applying rigorous comparative social science 
methodology, we also arrive at the conclusion that in terms of the initial ECOFIN definition of 
efficiency, the data presented in this article suggest that apart from Finland and the 
Netherlands, three new EU-27 member countries, especially the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia, provide interesting answers to the question about the efficiency of state 
expenditures in reducing poverty rates. 
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In this qualitative sociological and quantitative economic policy paper, we start out 
from the assumption of a very recent European Commission (ECOFIN, 2007) 
Background paper on the “Efficiency and effectiveness of social spending”, which says 
the effectiveness of social spending can be defined by the degree to which the realized 
allocation approaches the socially desired outcome. For the EU-Commission, the issue 
at stake is whether it is more important to foster equal opportunities for all people by 
guaranteeing access and solidarity or to guarantee equal outcomes for its citizens, 
through income redistribution systems. However much the present authors emphasize 
the great theoretical and empirical value of the efficiency definition, the far-reaching 
conclusions listed in the Commission paper are not supported by the empirical data, 
presented in the paper, let alone, by a solid econometric or politometric analysis in the 
spirit of the above definition. 
We try to perform such an analysis, starting from advances in recent literature, most 
convincingly proposed by Aiginger (2008). We also present a more encompassing 
sociological perspective on the issue and factor analytical calculations, which support 
our general argument about the “efficiency” of the Scandinavian model. 
A narrow micro-approach neglects a wider and more elaborated understanding of the 
social as outcome of the interaction and dialectic between people (constituted as actors) 
and their constructed and natural environment which allows to define social quality as 
the extent to which people are able to participate in the socio-economic, cultural, 
juridical and political life of their communities under conditions which enhance their 
well-being and individual potentials for contributing to societal development as well. A 
macro-approach, which is inspired by the rigorous indicator work of the United Nations 
Development Programme, allows opening the view on a developmental perspective that 
is not caught in the national enhancement orientation but seeks for developing a 
sustainable strategy that takes global issues into account. This means for welfare regime 
analysis that we have to overcome the functionalist determinism and equally the limited 
understanding of the relationship between economic and social policy as delivery, cost 
and supply relationship.  
Rather, properly understood as matter of global responsibility and systematic 
interrelationship – the economic processes being social relations and social processes 
being economic relations – the “Social Quality Approach” provides an alternative 
perspective on welfare system analysis, focusing on public policies rather than social 
policies. The challenge of this new approach is to build such a globally oriented 
conceptual framework, with which to analyse the mechanisms and their outcomes by 
applying its architecture, namely: (i) by defining the concept of ‘the social’, (ii) the 
recognition of the herewith ontologically related conditional factors, constitutional 
factors and normative factors, (iii) exploring the interaction of these three factors, (iv) 
elaborating the measurement instruments of these factors in an epistemological 
acceptable way. These factors and its domains are captured in the following table (see 
Table 1). 
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Social 
expenditur









expected (in % 
points) 
Predicted value (linear 
regression: social 
expenditures  
-> improvement of the 
social situation) 
[Eurostat data on 






[Eurostat data on 
poverty after 
social transfers] 
Czech Republic  19,3  4,73  -1,17  5,90 
Slovak Republic  17,3  2,13  -1,80  3,93 
Slovenia 23,7  3,33  0,22 3,11 
Netherlands 28,3  4,43  1,68  2,75 
Finland 26,6  3,83  1,14  2,69 
Malta 18,4  0,73  -1,45  2,18 
Denmark 30,9  4,53  2,50 2,03 
Hungary 20,7  1,13  -0,72  1,86 
Sweden 32,7  4,83  3,07  1,76 
Luxembourg 22,3  1,33  -0,22  1,55 
Ireland 18,2  0,03  -1,52  1,55 
Germany 29,6  2,93  2,09 0,84 
Estonia 13,1  -2,37  -3,13  0,76 
Austria 29.0  2,63  1,90  0,73 
Cyprus 17,8  -1,27  -1,64  0,37 
France 31,3  2,63  2,63  0,00 
Lithuania 13,3  -3,77  -3,07 -0,70 
Belgium 29,3  1,23  2,00  -0,76 
Romania 15,1  -3,67  -2,50  -1,17 
Poland 20,1  -2,17  -0,91  -1,25 
EU25 27,3  -0,07  1,36  -1,43 
EA13 27,8  -0,37  1,52  -1,89 
Portugal 24,7  -2,37  0,54  -2,91 
United Kingdom  26,3  -1,87  1,05  -2,92 
Latvia 12,9  -6,47  -3,19  -3,28 
Spain 20,6  -4,67  -0,76  -3,91 
Italy 26,0  -4,67  0,95  -5,62 
Greece 23,6  -5,97  0,19  -6,16 
Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and the standard Eurostat data: “Structural 
Lisbon Indicators”. The fourteen Lisbon indicators can be downloaded free of charge from the Eurostat 
website  at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1133,47800773,1133_47802558&_dad=portal&_sc
hema=PORTAL. This site also informs about the “short list” of the indicators, on methodology, quality 
profiles etc. The computer software for the calculation of these results was Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 
2003. For the rest of the notes see also: Table 1 of this work 
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The empirical politometric evidence, surveyed in this article, and which supports a 
“social quality approach”, suggests that in terms of the efficiency of the European social 
model there is the following geography of comparative European performance in place, 
which again underlines the importance of the Aiginger analysis about the importance of 
the “model Scandinavia”: 
•  The direct action against social exclusion, as best evidenced by the cases of 
Denmark and Ireland, combines very high expenditures on housing and for the fight 
against social exclusion, and a very high government contribution towards the 
financing of the social policy model. The model has a very low share of employer’s 
contribution in the financing of the model, and pension expenditures are a smaller 
part of total benefits. The trade-off with the effectiveness of poverty reduction is 
significant. 
•  Health and family social expenditures, typically present in Estonia and Ireland, 
combine very high expenditures on family and children, and on health, sickness and 
disability. Pension expenditures are a smaller part of total benefits. The trade-off 
with the effectiveness of poverty reduction is not significant, but positive. 
•  The neo-liberal approach, which means in effect that contributors, not the 
governments pay for the social system, is well present today in the Netherlands and 
in Romania. The model combines very high contributions by the insured persons 
and very low contributions by the state. The trade-off with the effectiveness of 
poverty reduction is not significant, but positive. 
•  There is a fourth model being practiced in Europe – it is the unemployment benefit 
centred approach. Belgium and Spain are the model countries. The model is based 
on a very high share of unemployment benefits per total benefits. The trade-off with 
the effectiveness of poverty reduction is significant at the 10% error level and 
positive. 
Applying rigorous state of the art cross-national comparative social science 
methodology, we also arrive at the conclusion that in terms of the initial ECOFIN 
definition of efficiency, the data presented in this article suggest that apart from Finland 
and the Netherlands, three new EU-27 member countries, especially the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia, provide interesting answers to the old and troubling question about the 
“bang” and the “buck”, i.e. the efficiency of state expenditures in reducing poverty 
rates. Italy, Spain and Greece in each case are among the worst performing countries in 
Europe. 
The mediocre performance of the often hailed best practice model of the United 
Kingdom on all accounts of this study should be also taken into account. 
 
  51. INTRODUCTION 
In this short sociological and economic policy paper, we start out from the assumption 
of the Commission Background paper (ECOFIN, 2007), which states on page 26: 
“Regarding redistribution, effectiveness of social spending can be defined by the degree 
to which the realized allocation approaches the socially desired outcome. For example, 
a social objective could be to reduce the risk of poverty (defined by some income 
threshold). If the market allocation without government intervention leaves 30% of the 
population at risk of poverty, effectiveness is measured by the extent to which 
government intervention reduces the poverty risk. Efficiency can be defined by the 
amount of foregone resources by moving towards the desired allocation. Social 
spending is more efficient if less resources are used for a given change, or if, for a given 
level of foregone resources, the economy moves closer to the desired allocation.” 
We are well aware of the fact that the issues at stake have many repercussions for 
overall European policy performance, especially the so-called Lisbon performance. For 
Aiginger (2008), the European model is no barrier to competitiveness, if it is reformed 
in the direction of fostering change and growth, improving incentives and qualifications. 
This is demonstrated in Aiginger, 2008 specifically by the Scandinavian countries, 
which now combine - after several crises, devaluations, unsuccessful fiscal 
consolidation - rapid growth, full employment, with a comprehensive welfare system 
and a high priority for ecological concerns and fairness.  
The successful countries had, Aiginger maintains, to undergo substantial changes to be 
able to adapt their specific version of the European Socio-economic Model to the 
challenges of globalization.  
For Aiginger, the strategy rested on five pillars:  
1.  Managed and balanced flexibility,  
2.  Making work pay and training an obligation,  
3.  Fiscal prudence plus quality of government,  
4.  Fostering investment into the future, and  
5.  Following a consistent long run strategy,  
embedded in trust and strong institutions. As far as institutions were concerned, the 
Scandinavian countries always had for Aiginger more inclusive institutions, and less 
insider-outsider problems (see also Lindbeck, 2006).  
The Scandinavia countries managed according to Aiginger to maintain and to exploit 
this property: the coverage of collective agreements is increasing, trade union 
membership is stable, both in contrast to continental economies. The inclusiveness of 
institutions and the trust in society enabled these countries to deregulate contracts, to 
make use of part-time work and fixed-term contracts without increasing poverty and 
exclusion. Four-partite decision making seems to be more open for radical change, than 
two-partite policy making, since at least two partners (government and experts) will 
represent general interests. And the strong position of firm representatives and of Trade 
Unions enables the countries to cope with the burden of change and with the 
reintegration of losers (than in case of government or experts led change). The burden 
of change is acceptable if it are derived from a positive vision and if the burden is 
distributed in a fair way. Complex reforms – like increasing flexibility and security at 
the same time – are feasible in trusting societies. Strong and inclusive institutions – 
  6including strong Trade Unions and strong employers' organisation, will not over 
exaggerate for specific interests, thus preventing Olson's petrification hypothesis 
(Olson, 1986). In the ideal case they will help to foster externalities (e.g. innovation, 
education, lifelong leaning) thus making the economies more competitive, while 
reducing unemployment, uncertainties and ecological problems.  
For Aiginger and associates (2007), the central question is the characterization of a 
number of welfare state models in the tradition of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1996 and 
1999/2000), analysing the economic and social performance of these different welfare 
regimes on an encompassing empirical basis both in the long run and with respect to 
their adaptability to the challenges of the last decades. While for Aiginger and 
associates the differences with regard to growth dynamics had been very small in the 
decades after World War II (1960–1990), growth rates as well as the employment and 
social policy records have diverged over the past 15 years. The best performances were 
found for the extremes: the Scandinavian model and the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, 
while the continental model produced low growth and increasing unemployment. The 
reforms primarily in the Scandinavian countries allow them to delineate elements of a 
"New Welfare State Architecture" which on the one hand upholds important 
characteristics of a European social model, but on the other hand allows welfare states 
to be competitive in the globalising economy. Such a European socio-economic model 
could redirect incentives in such a way that the welfare state is able to shift from a 
burden (increasing costs and lowering flexibility) to a productive force. 
Tausch, Heshmati and Balajan (2007) think that only a Schumpeterian vision of 
capitalism as a process of "creative destruction"
3 - or rather - "destructive creation" can 
explain the contradictions, which they empirically reveal in this analysis, and which for 
them beset the "Lisbon process" from the very beginning. Their factor analysis shows 
that a majority of the fourteen “kernel Lisbon indicators” go indeed hand in hand with 
high comparative price levels; high freight transport; high greenhouse gas emissions; 
low business investment rates; and low youth educational attainment rates. The authors 
conclude that in reality we are facing four underlying and contradictory processes 
including a Lisbon productivity factor; high eco-social exclusion; the employment 
performance; and the neo-liberal European model. 
HM Treasury et al. (2008) argue that the knowledge-based economy favours labour 
market entrants and workers with higher skills, while technological and structural 
change may require new and different types of skills, which will need to be updated 
throughout the lifecycle. Human capital formation is therefore crucial – to promote 
opportunity and employability of workers, and to increase the innovative capacity of 
companies and economies (see Tausch, Bischof and Mueller, 2007). Demographic 
change makes a culture of lifelong learning even more important. In the opinion of the 
policy paper of the three Finance Ministries (Germany, Sweden, United Kingdom), 
education alone, however, is not enough. It has to be complemented, the three Finance 
Ministries argue, by policies to remove barriers to labour market participation, and set 
in the context of well-functioning labour, product and capital markets and 
macroeconomic stability that together allow for high levels of job creation and 
international competitiveness.  
                                            
3 Schumpeter (1934, 1942 and 1950). 
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successful policies and draw on examples of what they call modern policy design and 
development from across Europe, so “we can begin to learn together and from each 
other to equip our citizens with the necessary skills to make the most of the 
opportunities in the global age. In this way security is provided as people can manage 
and take advantage of change, without protecting specific jobs”
4. The “best practice” 
models, referred to in the study, include the national childcare investment programme 
2006–2010 in the Irish Republic, the universal childcare system in Sweden, the 
Portuguese policies to reduce early school dropouts, Finland’s system of high quality 
basic education, the Dutch system of matching vocational training with market demand, 
the Danish apprenticeship system, the new UK diploma system, higher education tuition 
fees in the UK and in the Netherlands, and the labour market reforms in Germany from 
2002 onwards.  
Since the sociological reasoning behind the classification of social welfare regimes is 
often unclear, we compare here the Commission approach with a more general 
sociological perspective. 
Rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 the main findings by the 
European Commission is presented. Section 3 contains discussions including: 
sociological perspective on welfare regimes, and an answer without real questions; the 
alternatives of welfare capitalism or welfare systems; social policy or policy for 
developing and maintaining the social; institutionalist functionalism versus social 
development; and extended rational choice and methodological individualism. Section 4 
is a critique on computation methodology employed by the European Commission 
followed by a comparison of our own methodology and that of the European 
Commission in Section 5. The issue of reliability of estimates of the efficiency of social 
policy is discussed in Section 6 and those of the correlates of the efficiency of social 
policy expenditure in Section 7. The mathematical model of multivariate analysis, its 
usefulness, strengths and limitation and empirical results are discussed in Section 8 and 
9, respectively. The final Section concludes.    
 
2. THE MAIN FINDINGS BY THE COMMISSION 
The European Commission says in their paper (page 6 ff) that: 
1.  The issue at stake is whether it is more important to foster equal opportunities for all 
people (to start well in life and make the most of the chances offered), by 
guaranteeing access and solidarity (as stressed by the recent Commission 
Communication "Opportunities and access: a new social vision for 21st century 
Europe"), or to guarantee equal outcomes for its citizens, through income 
redistribution systems.  
2.  Redirect rather than increase public expenditure. Increased spending in itself will 
not necessarily improve the quality of social services.  
3.  When reforming social schemes, a comprehensive approach is needed. Revisions in 
the pension systems and in the unemployment benefit schemes should be 
                                            
4 http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/european_economic_reform/social_bridges_ii.cfm 
  8implemented in parallel, through the tightening of eligibility criteria and the revision 
of the incentive structure for the access to social benefits such as disability pensions 
and sickness benefits. Access should be limited to those who genuinely qualify, in 
order to avoid that they become alternative pathways to early retirement or to 
unemployment benefits.  
4.  Encouraging people to work longer and be more active in order to cope with the 
social, economic, fiscal and other challenges posed by ageing populations.  
5.  "Making work pay" through appropriate incentives so that tax/benefit systems do 
not hinder labour market dynamics and actually help to facilitate structural change.  
6.  Pursuing further the ongoing efforts to improve cost-effectiveness and long term 
financial sustainability of health care while ensuring access to adequate healthcare 
and improving health outcomes 
7.  Evaluate and screen regularly the efficiency of social policies, with a strong 
emphasis on value for money.  
 
3. WELFARE REGIMES 
3.1 Welfare Regimes – Developing a Sociological Perspective 
It is now appropriate to present a more encompassing sociological perspective on 
“welfare regimes” with reference to institutions and the Social. Ever since the 
publication of Esping-Andersen’s “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990), social 
scientists have categorized advanced Western welfare states at least in three variants: 
either as a Nordic social-democratic system, or as a conservative system on the 
European continent, or as a liberal welfare state system in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
With Jayasuriya (2008), these three models of the welfare state are briefly described 
below: 
1.  The Liberal/Free Market regimes are characterised by selectivist residual welfare 
which is a targeted means tested welfare for the poor and places limits on the realm 
of social rights The latter may include features such as welfare recipients having 
relative equality, market differentiated welfare among the majority, means tested 
poor relief, and private pensions and private expenditure on health. This is typical of 
the USA welfare system which relies on a high degree of private market 
supplementation for those not entitled to benefits, and increasingly evident in the 
contemporary Australian welfare system. 
2.  The Conservative/Corporatist or Social Market type of welfare state upholds status 
differences by linking welfare benefits (‘social rights’) to compulsory membership 
in occupationally differentiated welfare schemes, e.g., of social insurance. 
Accordingly, welfare outcomes are limited by features such as income maintenance 
benefits, other corporatist contributions and earning related characteristics. This type 
of welfare regime based on employee rights and benefit adequacy tends to be 
characteristic of the European Welfare State systems such as Germany (again under 
threat from neo-liberal social and economic theorists). 
3.  The Social Democratic/Scandinavian model of the welfare state is organised around 
universal benefits or citizens with social rights having equal benefits. Importantly, 
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of minimal needs and what is more, avoids the dualism of state and markets. This is 
characteristic of Scandinavian social democratic states (e.g., Sweden), and also the 
UK to some extent, where redistribution and social solidarity were major objectives 
at least before the dismantling of the welfare state by Thatcher. 
Scheme 1 shows the resultant three models of welfare states (‘welfare state’ regimes’) 
based on each type of index, namely the de-commodification and stratification indices. 
The industrialized countries are grouped into three groups by their index level and 
models of the welfare state. 
 
Scheme 1:  Esping-Anderson’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 
Index of De-commodification  Index of  Stratification 
Low Medium High Liberal  Conservative  Socialist 
Australia Italy  Austria  Australia  Austria  Denmark 
USA Japan  Belgium  Canada  Belgium  Finland 
New Zealand  France  Netherlands  Japan  France  Netherlands 
Ireland Finland  Norway  USA  Italy  Sweden 
UK Switzerland  Sweden       
Esping Anderson (1990): Table 2.21  
 
3.2 Welfare Regimes – An Answer without Real Questions 
As we already said briefly, it seems at least nowadays impossible to enter a debate on 
issues as they are brought forward here not just without making reference to this 
mentioned typology of the different welfare regimes (apart from the mentioned work of 
Esping-Andersen 1990; see as well e.g. Ferrara, Maurizio and Rhodes, 2000). And 
indeed, his proposed three “models” are at first sight plausible, easily fitting into the 
debate of policy challenges of the time. However, it is exactly this, what characterises 
the weakness of the approach. Esping-Andersen’s work, from a sociological 
perspective, fundamentally lacks important analytical dimensions and is – at most – an a 
posteriori approach to future policy making. The lack of analytical thinking concerns 
especially the following three dimensions: 
•  The definition of social policy is structurally limited on the institutional system, 
not only leaving the development of alternative pathways and instruments out of 
sight, but moreover fundamentally neglecting the provision of a clear 
understanding of what the social actually is, i.e. what the goal and aim of any 
social policy is, 
•  The fostering of the institutionalist perspective of social policy, and finally 
•  The promotion of a one-sided methodology of an extended methodological 
individualism. 
 
  103.3 Welfare Capitalism or Welfare Systems?  
This section discusses the welfare capitalism versus welfare systems with reference to 
the lack of an economic framework. The most common reference is made to welfare 
regimes, commonly defined:  
as a particular constellation of social, political and economic arrangements which tend 
to nurture a particular welfare system, which in turn supports a particular pattern of 
stratification, and thus feeds back into its own stability (Taylor-Gooby: 1996: 199 ff.; 
here: 200)  
or in the words of Gøsta Esping-Andersen  
A welfare regime can be defined as the combined, interdependent way in which welfare 
is produced and allocated between state, market, and family (Esping-Andersen, 
1999/2000: 34 f.). 
Esping-Andersen’s work should be submitted to a further critique here. First, though 
with the publication of his work the issue of welfare typologies gained momentum in 
the academic and public-political debate, it seems important to mention the preceding 
theoretical efforts, which in many ways seem to be far more consistent than Esping-
Andersen’s approach. As far as social science is concerned, there had been earlier works 
being hugely relevant on the issues under debate here. Though one could go much 
further – for instance by including even the work of William Beveridge himself – there 
are two major forerunners, each with a very specific stance which is lost in the current 
debates. First, it is useful to look at the work undertaken by Harold Wilenski and 
Charles Lebaux, who stated: 
Two conceptions of social welfare seem to be dominant in the United States today: the 
residual and the institutional. The first holds that social welfare institutions should 
come into play only when the normal structures of supply, the family and the market, 
break down. The second, in contrast, sees welfare services as normal, ‘first line’ 
functions of modern industrial society … In our view, neither ideology exists in a 
vacuum; each is a reflection of the broader cultural and social conditions ... and with 
further industrialization the second is likely to prevail (Wilensky and Lebeaux 1976: 
138, 140)
5. 
Here, the conceptualisation is based on a simplified understanding of modernisation, 
namely employing three theses. 
•  The authors start from the assumption that overall societal development is coined 
by a shift from the residual to the institutional model, and 
•  Following the US American understanding of the 1950s, such modernisation is 
understood in simple terms as increasing industrialisation, consequently 
                                            
5   Of course, reading this one can interpret as well the basic document of catholic social thinking and its emphasis of 
subsidiarity (see Rerum Novarum Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor [1891]   
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html 
– 06/07/06; 9.10 a.m.; Quadragesimo Anno. Encyclical of Pope Pius XI on Reconstruction of the Social Order to our 
Venerable Brethren, the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, Bishops, and Other Ordinaries in Peace and Communion 
with the Apostolic See, and Likewise to All the Faithful of the Catholic World [1931] – 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-
anno_en.html – 0607/ ; 9.09 a.m.) as a matter of welfare regime challenge and proposition. 
  11•  The development of the institutional model is measured as increase of the 
spending of the social expenditure, relative to the GDP. 
However, the approach is remarkable, as it develops a typology not from an 
international perspective, but from an analysis within the national framework. This 
entails a fundamental difference as well if compared with Esping-Andersen. What is 
decisively distinct is the taken perspective: whereas the latter is strictly institutionalist, 
Wilensky and Lebaux (1976) aim on detecting a wider understanding not only of the 
institutionalist system but as well of the actual setting of objectives. Sure, this is geared 
to discussing the value of the ‘American way of social policy’ – and the need of 
reconsidering its structure while facing the challenge of early globalisation. Although 
one can well debate the presented way, the approach discusses at least to some extent as 
well the actual meaning, the aims and objectives of social policy – an endeavour 
Esping-Andersen falls entirely short of doing. 
Later, Richard Titmuss presented from a British perspective, however now taking an 
international comparative stance three models, namely: 
•  The residual welfare model of social policy, 
•  The industrial achievement-performance model of social policy and 
•  The institutional-redistributive model of social welfare (see Titmuss1974: 30 f.). 
On the one hand, economic approaches often fall in many cases short by reducing 
economic matters on technical relationships of individualised actors in economic 
transaction processes – and from there they would need to be translated into their core 
of being fundamentally socially determined relationships. In this regard the theory of 
regulation is much more suitable to provide a suitable framework for welfare systems 
analysis. However, and this is the other side: any regulationist approach (for a 
discussion see for instance Boyer and Saillard, 1995; Jessop and Sum, 2006) aims on an 
integrated systems analysis (see for further elaboration: Herrmann Peter: forthcoming). 
Although this means to use this approach as well as a tool of a somewhat functionalist 
analysis of an existing system, it goes far beyond the welfare regime analysis of the 
Esping-Andersen style as the latter takes the stance of a genuine link between welfare 
and capitalism for eternally unquestionable. In other words, the current debate of 
welfare regimes, as it is largely inspired by the work of Esping-Andersen, is 
fundamentally fading out what welfare systems are actually about. Rather asking such a 
question, they are looking for optimising the way of administering the deficits. 
Of course, this does not come as a surprise – and with this we arrive at the second 
aspect of the questionable career of the welfare regime analysis of the said type. Of 
course, any abstract contemplation for its own sake is, from a sociological perspective, 
questionable – it had been pronouncedly said that it is not a matter of philosophically 
reinterpreting the world but of obtaining with any analysis the means that enable 
political change. In this light there is nothing wrong with the fact that welfare regime 
analysis is a child of practical requirements of politics – it had been mentioned already 
that this was as well the case with the work presented by Wilensky and Lebeaux. 
However, the fact of social science being responsive towards political request nor the 
fact that social science can only be thought as theory of practice should not undermine 
the following two facts. First, any approach is mislead by taking the advice of being 
affirmative per se. Second, any reduction of social research on institutionalist – or 
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accountability.  
It is in this regard relevant to see that – taking the later development – the debate on 
welfare capitalism was actually a direct answer on an at the time burning European 
issue: What had became known as Eurosclerosis was like a conflagration, undermining 
the anyway little trust into the process of European integration. Due to different 
moments it was getting obvious that the strategy of increasing European economic 
strength without the immediate consideration of the effects on people’s daily life and 
without the factual consideration of issues of democracy was not going to work. 
Furthermore, the somewhat tokenist social policy of the early phases from the middle of 
the 1970s did not allow developing any sound perspectives for the future. Against this 
background, works dealing with the worlds of welfare capitalism had been of course 
welcome. They opened for politicians the opportunity to show (or at least to pretend) 
their seriousness of taking into account the reverence towards national traditions and 
showing at the same time their effort to improve what they claimed to be the social 
quality of European citizens. 
 
3.4 Social Policy or Policy for Developing and Maintaining the Social 
The term “social quality” had been used in the European Commission’s Social Policy 
Agenda from 2000 (European Commission, 2000), though it had been suggested in a 
very limited perspective: as matter of social policy as distinct policy area – in this way 
reproducing the shortcoming which had been mentioned before: the inadequacy of a 
dichotomisation of social policies and economic policies (see for further discussion 
Herrmann, 2005 and 2007).
6 Such separation of social policy is very much the political 
complement of the reductionist approach
7 as delivered by welfare regime analysis. In a 
way this is surprising as Michel Albert presented another approach (see Albert, 1991) 
that would have allowed European policy makers a more integrated approach towards a 
European social competitiveness approach. However, the advantage of the chosen 
‘model’ allowed at least to look for a more technical answer, maintaining the traditional 
departmentalised policy – by the way a strategy that was as well promoted by Albert. 
In his scathing attack on European “reductionism”, Clesse (2008), who must be called a 
real “insider” of the European strategy debate over the last years, comes to the 
following conclusion, which is of course not very pleasant for the neo-liberal 
mainstream: 
“Brussels is the weak, cold heart of the Union, regulating and de-regulating, imposing 
norms and standards, pumping money but not political content through the veins of the 
organisation. The EU is a gutless, spiritless, headless organisation held together by 
little else than material incentives. It is the kind of Europe the British or Scandinavians 
have always cherished, and that the other nations no longer have the spirit to oppose. 
There is now a serious risk of a slow erosion of the EU's basic ideological consensus, 
its political fabric and its social tissue. If so, Europe will be unable to avoid long-term 
                                            
6 For a sequence of the European Commissions joint report on social protection see EC (2203, 2005, 
2006, 2007 and 2007)  
7 On the “reductionist approach” see also Clesse, 2008.  
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nationalism and right-wing extremism that will focus on foreigners and immigrants, and 
specifically on Muslims” (Clesse, 2008). 
In any case, the problem with all these paradigms is not least that they are very much 
oriented towards a static, statist and nationalist approach.
8 In addition they lack any 
vision of what the aims of policies actually are. By and large it can be said that this is 
very much a consequence of the institutionalism and its functionalist perspective of 
maintenance in the tradition of Parsonian thinking.  
As such it fits indeed as well, from a sociological perspective, into the orientation of the 
Lisbon strategy of making Europe the most competitive region, a stance that had been 
recently confirmed in a document launched by the European Commission and being 
concerned with globalisation. As much as it has to be welcomed that the Commission 
actually emphasised that globalisation is a process that is not just to be observed but of 
which the developmental direction and its shape need to be influenced the fundamental 
shortcoming is that the document promotes the traditional way: following the Lisbon 
strategy, the aim of such influence is to gain competitive advantage. In this light, the 
view on social policy is that on its instrumental character, searching for its ‘productive 
role’. The problem with such productivist orientation – and this is as well a fundamental 
problem of the model of the developmental welfare state – is that it actually reduces the 
economic perspective on applying a micro-economic perspective (see in general terms 
as well the remarks below when we look at an Extended Rational Choice and 
Methodological Individualism). It is important to highlight against such micro-
perspective of a productive role of social policy that it is not about the contribution of 
social policy to economic development. Rather, the central issue is that we are looking 
at the interlink of economic and social development – of which social policy is one part 
but not more. In other words, what defines the macro-economic perspective is that view 
on the development of society itself and the task to develop a high priority for cohesion 
– though this has to be seen in a wider context as developed as part of the Social Quality 
Approach as it is briefly presented here as well. 
 
3.5 Institutionalist Functionalism versus Social Development 
A narrow micro-approach neglects a wider and more elaborated understanding of the 
social as outcome of the interaction and dialectic between people (constituted as actors) 
and their constructed and natural environment which allows to define social quality as 
the extent to which people are able to participate in the socio-economic, cultural, 
juridical and political life of their communities under conditions which enhance their 
well-being and individual potentials for contributing to societal development as well. A 
macro-approach allows opening the view on a developmental perspective that is not 
caught in the national enhancement orientation but seeks for developing a sustainable 
strategy that takes global issues into account. This means for welfare regime analysis 
that we have to overcome the functionalist determinism and equally the limited 
understanding of the relationship between economic and social policy as delivery, cost 
and supply relationship. Rather, properly understood as matter of global responsibility 
                                            
8   Where nationalist can as well mean that it is referring to a larger region as we find it now as the traditional and 
existing nation states. In this understanding it may include for instance the European Union 
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social processes being economic relations – the Social Quality Approach provides an 
alternative perspective on welfare system analysis, focusing on public policies rather 
than social policies. The challenge of this new approach is to build such a globally 
oriented conceptual framework, with which to analyse the mechanisms and their 
outcomes by applying its architecture, namely: (i) by defining the concept of ‘the 
social’, (ii) the recognition of the herewith ontologically related conditional factors, 
constitutional factors and normative factors, (iii) exploring the interaction of these three 
factors, and (iv) elaborating the measurement instruments of these factors in an 
epistemological acceptable way. These factors and its domains are captured in the 
following table (Scheme 2). 
 
Scheme 2: Factors associated with the social quality approach. 









social justice (equity) 
solidarity 
Democratic based citizenship  
human dignity 
 
It is decisive that any approach of defining meaningful practice for social policy has to 
consider:  
(a) To shift from a reductionist approach of the traditional institutionalist patterns, 
moving towards a broader understanding of public policy, i.e. a policy in the public, by 
the public and for the public. It is important – and widely shown in the remainder of this 
chapter – that we are dealing with an integrated approach that entails economic, 
environmental, cultural, international and many other policies, social policy in the 
traditional understanding only one amongst others.  
(b) Furthermore it is important to acknowledge that it is about the architecture, i.e. the 
interplay of the different factors that determine what these policies are about. 
 
3.6 Extended Rational Choice and Methodological Individualism 
Overall, any other approach that does not start from an understanding of the social as it 
is proposed in the preceding remarks
9 fails, in a sociological perspective, necessarily 
short of developing a sound social policy, be it that is competitive-nationalist or be it 
that it is competitive socially-divisonist – for the latter we see several examples in the 
so-called Asian tiger economies, the countries that only recently joined the European 
Union and the celebrated Celtic Tiger – all showing that economic progress had been 
largely paid for by an increasing inequality within the countries in question and as well 
an increasing divide between countries (cf. Schmieding, 2007, Herrmann: forthcoming; 
Alber and Lenarz, 2008). 
                                            
9   of course, this does not mean that the exact wording or even approach has to be subscribed to (for further discussion 
see the three books of the European Foundation on Social Quality for which details are available from 
www.socialquality.eu). However, it means that a sound theoretical discussion has to be entered. 
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assumptions of any welfare regime analysis are based in the rational choice of 
individuals but as well of systems. In other words, the current mainstream welfare 
regime approach starts from the postulation that social systems are actually behaving in 
a rational way and it is in this perspective that social policy – as distinct subsystems – 
are part of a productivity approach. The ‘political extension’ of such perspective is the 
notion that it is claimed that some scope is claimed (a) for defining what the output of 
the productive system should be (as some extent of internal equity, the role of education 
etc.) and (b) for the definition of the investment side of the social expenditure. If we 
look through much of the literature – and as well if we look at the current report 
presented by the European Commission – we find, from a sociological viewpoint, a 
reductionist approach towards assessing social expenditures. One can even go a step 
further, saying that what is actually measured is not the effectiveness of social 
expenditure. Instead the measurement is geared towards measuring the effect of 
individual beneficiaries. So, in actual fact it is not about the productive role of social 
policy in terms of its contribution towards the development of social spaces as it had 
been proposed with the definition of the social in the preceding section. Rather it is a 
matter of increased individual wellbeing. Such an understanding of effectiveness of 
social spending is as well fundamentally characterised by the acceptance of inequality 
and departmentalisation. 
Looking at inequality first, we can see that a fundamental issue of current policies is for 
instance the frequent reference made to the role of education. Peter C.Y Chow from the 
World Bank Institute, for instance, writes that:  
[s]ocial expenditure and economic development have interacted with each other in 
many developing economies …First of all, educational achievement and economic 
development have a reciprocal cause-and-effect relationship in the developmental 
process (Chow, 2008). 
However, what is forgotten is that much of the educational orientation had been 
following a rather limited understanding, being to a large extent geared towards 
appropriation of skills rather than a holistic educational process. This can be evidenced 
by the huge number of foreign doctorates, aiming at importing skills rather than 
providing a broad and fundamental knowledge base for further development. Another 
point in this context can be seen within Europe: much of the Bologna process can 
actually be seen as strategy of marketing education and merchandising degrees rather 
than broadening access of the educational system. In this light the increasing 
‘investment’ into the educational system, commonly celebrated as a success and the 
growing output in terms of graduating students can equally be seen as a lack of the 
preceding system: from own experiences and from talking to colleagues it is actually 
evident that the quality of the output is seen as largely decreasing. The point in question 
is the paradox that the increasing socialisation of education factually translates into a 
most profound individualisation which is linked to the commodification of education 
(see for instance Herrmann and Ryan 2005, Herrmann, forthcoming). 
The entire widespread strategy of the privatisation of up to hitherto public (social) 
services disregards the fact that much of the investment, now undertaken by private 
investors, is probably more effective than public investment if we look in a short term 
and departmentalist perspective or a slightly extended version, namely the efforts to 
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conventional wisdom of budgeting policies is more or less aware of the fact that both 
cross-sectional and inter-temporary dimensions need to be considered. 
Three points are of crucial importance here – not least when it comes to measuring 
efficiency of social expenditure. 
•  First, taking the understanding of social services serious, we have to acknowledge 
that this is about the recognition of public responsibility. This means not least that 
any ambivalence with regard to the welfare state has to be rejected. Though there is 
without doubt the need of reforms, there is nevertheless the requirement to maintain 
its ability to perform. 
•  Second, this means as well to acknowledge the width of its performance. Again, 
looking in a micro-perspective at the performance issue may occasionally – though 
not necessarily –we may be facing advantages of private and small business use for 
achieving higher efficiency and/or better performance. However, in most of the 
cases it means that this is due to the fact that in this way negative externalities are 
produced at the same time, structurally bound to the processes of privatisation. As 
well the other way round, the provision of public services – and only this – can 
guarantee equality of opportunities, provision of cross-range social services etc. 
•  Third, this means that the suggested orientation of an increasingly targeted policy 
and the orientation on provision of services for the most disadvantaged, people who 
are furthest away from the labour market etc. is misleading: (a) In actual fact we see 
that it are those systems with a high rate of public provisions for the entire society – 
rather than the most excluded – that perform best. The successes of the Nordic 
countries are in the meantime well documented. (b) Furthermore it is important to 
highlight that any societal policy (and this goes beyond a simplistic and reductionist 
model of social policy) – has to aim on redistribution. As much as any analysis and 
policy has also consider influencing the actual economic process as matter of social 
relationships, it has to consider as well the redistributive role – questions of actual 
wealth (re-)distribution are one side, issues of distribution between the generations, 
between families with and without children or between healthy and ill people are 
just a few examples. And they actually show pretty well that existing systems, 
geared to establishing and maintaining social cohesion are rather effective – and in 
which way they are so. Although selective systems are or have to be efficient in 
providing particular services (and this can well mean: good services for a limited 
number of people) in terms of their character as social services fall short of quality 
performance. In other words, it still has to be acknowledged that they are 
redistributive as well, but being built on a principle of cherry picking, leaving a 
major burden to be carried by the public – an externality producing in this way 
social divergence rather than contributing to social cohesion. 
With respect to welfare regime analysis there is then as well an approach that actually 
goes beyond the decommodifiction issue and takes, instead, account of the social 
dimension of economic integration. In other words, the one – and somewhat 
reductionist – dimension of social policy is to which extent people are taken out of the 
obligatory system of employment. However, another dimension is the degree and way 
of including people into the labour market for instance via active labour market policies 
– and instructive example can be taken from Powell’s and Barrientos’ (2004) work. 
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short of the said wider definitional background as suggested – though the concept is 
well known it is rarely applied when we look especially at recent debates. If we take 
social quality as point reference rather than ‘wellbeing’ – be it the wellbeing of 
individuals or the ‘social wellbeing’ – the multidimensionality of the challenge is 
systematically faded out. The concept known is the one of public goods or non-cash 
merit goods. However, it is rarely taken up as it is more or less difficult to calculate. 
The more fundamental question – and this is one that goes through the wider 
conceptualisation of social expenditure literature – is that the underlying approach refers 
to goods – to an understanding of a commodifiable character of welfare. Leaving aside 
general issues of discussions around the ‘general interest’ (see Herrmann, 2007; 
Herrmann, 2007) the core problem here is that the concept of a public good or non-cash 
merit good is misleading as it still suggests an exchange relationship – then very much 
leading as well to the dichotomisation of suppliers and users – the problematic and not 
least theoretical challenge cannot be discussed here. 
In an international and global perspective respectively a point of departure for reshaping 
the debate may be seen in a contribution made some time ago by Ian Gough, writing on 
Globalization and Regional Welfare Regimes (Gough, 2001). He points importantly on 
the complex interaction of: 
•  International Factors 
•  Socio-economic Environment 
•  Political Mobilization 
•  State Institutions 
•  Social Policies 
(ibid.: 168) 
Important in this work is that Gough goes beyond the standard social policy orientations 
– balancing input and output – and largely includes the welfare mix and more 
importantly work-related issues, thus the ‘social dimension of economics’. 
Another important sociological discussion is around an extended understanding not of 
wellbeing or social expenditure but more importantly about economic growth. There is 
of course not much doubt about the need of economic growth. However the 
understanding of what such growth is about is definitely another and still open question. 
In this respect we find different approaches – on the one hand aiming on developing a 
different understanding of the individuals status (for instance the work by Amartya Sen 
1987 and 1992; for an overview see www.justpeace.htm) or the different approach 
towards measuring the same (see e.g. Canoy and Lerais, 2007) – a kind of mediating 
position can be seen in the work on the Human Development Reports as elaborated by 
the United Nations (see http://hdr.undp.org/en.
10  
In other terms and coming back to the earlier debate of welfare regimes and world of 
welfare capitalism, we are looking for an alternative by considering a sound theory and 
criteria for an empirical analysis that looks at ‘welfare production’ not along the axis of 
commodifcation versus decommodification. Instead, it is the search for criteria that 
                                            
10 S ee furthermore Addison and Heshmati (2004); Bhandari and Heshmati (2007); Heshmati (2003, 
2006a and 2007); Heshmati and Oh (2006); and Heshmati and Tausch (2007). 
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matter of responsibilities and the development of societies and communities to develop 
in an integrated and sustainable way. Precisely the rigorous social indicator approach, 
chosen by the United Nations Development Programme, seems to be a strategy, which 
should be applied more frequently to the European social policy debate. 
An interesting contribution comes here from Ian Gough who arrives at a typology that is 
not limited to input-output analysis but combines the outcome analysis with the analysis 
of a combined provider/social reality analysis. Looking in this perspective on Human-
Well-Being and Social Structures and taking a global perspective, he arrives at the 
following:   
more specific regime types in different zones of the world: mixed liberal-informal 
welfare regimes in Latin American countries outside of the Caribbean; productivist 
welfare regimes in East-Asia, informal security regimes in South Asia; and a 
generalized insecurity system in much of Africa. (Gough, 2004: p. 301) 
However, as helpful as such an approach is, the problem remains unresolved, in which 
way the subjective dimensions Gough talks about can be taken out of a real of 
arbitrariness. In the view of the present analysis, the reference made to Habermasian 
discourse-theories falls short resolving such problems, in particular when it comes to 
developing a global perspective. 
There is a further important conclusion that has to be drawn from here: critics of welfare 
regime analysis are to a large extent concerned with the fact that Esping-Andersen 
moulded approaches are neglecting certain aspects – e.g. the role of women and gender 
divides in terms of ‘background features’, maintaining the welfare systems, the role of 
NGOs as additional ‘suppliers’ of services etc. (by the way aspects Esping-Andersen 
took up in his later work).  
A further point in question is of course minority rights. Clesse (2008) with justification 
says:  
A dramatic example of this wrong-headed approach has been the issue of minority 
rights. The Union failed to apply the criteria it had set in Copenhagen by choosing to 
ignore the disastrous situation of the Roma in many central and eastern European 
countries, above all in Romania where up to 2.5m people of that ethnic group live in 
abject poverty and are daily victims of contempt and discrimination. Their situation is 
not much better in Slovakia and in some other neighbouring countries. It is only now, 
with the Roma having come to Rome, that the Romans want to put the issue high on the 
EU agenda. Unfortunately, the incentives for Romania and the others to act, and the 
means of pressure available to other member states are limited. (Clesse, 2008) 
However, in general, the question of what the actual social outcome is about is not even 
considered by the critics. This means as well to reduce measuring the efficiency of 
social spending on issues of a link that is theoretically established as causal 
relationship.
11 In other words, social policy is as such defined in an extremely narrow 
way: a matter of mechanical cause-effect relationship. However, no social policy works 
in this way. In a project on social services, this view was specifically widened not by 
                                            
11 For discussion of measuring aggregate social efficiency see Ravallion (2005).  
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seen as a matter of enhancing the field of measuring itself, seeing it as matter of 
multidimensional dialectical relationships. There focusing on social services, the given 
definition had been proposed as 
These are any activity that is undertaken  
•  to enhance individuals’ well-being and 
•  that is based on human and social rights,  
•  that contributes to the cohesion of the community and wider social relationships 
and at the same time enables or empowers the individuals concerned (Herrmann: 
2005; for a wider analysis and debate see various contributions in Herrmann et 
al. 2007) 
However, decisive is in this context the different approach with regards to ‘users’ or 
beneficiaries, broadly falling under society, the state as institutionalist system and the 
‘clients’ in the traditional sense of beneficiaries of social policies. In other words, the 
perspective taken here is the one of a citizen-approach. 
This can be used as blueprint insofar as it overcomes at least to some extent the general 
trend of understanding social services in particular and social policy in general as 
commodifiable. This point again on a fundamental shortcoming of the mainstream 
welfare regime analysis: Emphasising the decommodifying aspects of social policy, it 
falls short of critically analysing the actual character of social policy, social benefits and 
social services. As correct as it is to look at their institutional forms and impact, they are 
primarily in themselves social relationships and subsystems of a wider social 
relationship – and it is only by measuring this that the real meaning can be made out. 
One element of this is that the debate has to include not least the political dimensions as 
it goes beyond the institutional political system, and aims on the political structures, 
including the role social policy plays in respect to the ‘life world’-dimension of the 
democratic process – matter that is relevant in terms of developing the integrity of the 
system, the mobilisation of different forces and the way of how the system relates in a 
global context (see for instance Cook and Kwon, 2007). 
A further crucial element to it is the need of developing a sound concept of socio-
economic sustainability in the context of globalisation. However, the mainstream 
approach is concerned with the competitive side of globalisation. If we take together 
two major EU-statements – on the one hand the Lisbon agenda emphasising the goal of 
developing Europe’s competitiveness, on the other hand the more recent claim that 
globalisation is not something Europe just has to face but that it can be and has to be 
influenced and shaped by the EU – it shows a decisive shortcoming. In this light, any 
strive for social cohesion and sustainability is limited by its orientation towards the 
competitiveness pillar. In simple terms it means that externalities are produced and 
these will – over short or long – resurge as real and actual ‘costs’, be they economic or 
social costs. This is the case on a global level and also within the EU where we find 
shifts and rebalances but no real strategic changes. The standard indicators are very 
much geared to a mono-causal approach to specific ‘problems’. However, the foregoing 
debate on welfare regimes and the efficiency of social expenditure should have shown 
that this is insufficient. And the brief introduction of the social quality approach will 
have shown a way for policy analysis and policy making. For instance, while the 
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should be used in the policy process. A similar ranking derived from the social quality 
concept would point directly to policy domains and sub-domains in socio-economic 
security, social cohesion, social inclusion and social empowerment and the connection 
between them. 
 
4. TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF THE COMMISSIONS METHODOLOGY 
However much the present authors emphasize the great theoretical and empirical value 
of this definition, given in the European Commission paper, they allow themselves to 
remark that the far-reaching conclusions listed in the European Commission paper, are 
not supported by the empirical data, presented in the paper, let alone, by a solid 
econometric or politometric analysis in the spirit of the above definition. A number of 
authors from the economics profession, like Addison (2006); Addison and Heshmati 
(2004); Aiginger et al. (2007); Aiginger (2008); Apps and Rees (2004); Atkinson 
(2005); Atkinson, et al (2002); Atkinson, Marlier and Nolan (2004); Barr (1998); Barro 
and Lee (2000); Bhandari and Heshmati (2007); Harris (2004); Heshmati (2003, 2006b 
and 2007); Heshmati and Oh (2006); Heshmati and Tausch (2007); Jayasuriya (2006 
and 2008); Papadopoulos and Tsakloglou (2003); Tausch, 2006), Rein (1970 and 1976) 
were always conscious about the limitations of the strictly “micro”-approach, referred to 
above in our sociological theory chapter, and opted for perspective, which is compatible 
with the overall objectives of the “social quality approach” and the work inspired by the 
indicator work of the United Nations Development Programme, pioneered by the work 
of Amartya Sen. 
In addition, the European Commission paper uses poverty data from the early 2000s, 
and not the very latest Eurostat figures for 2006, which already are available and which 
already cover well the situation of social exclusion in the entire EU-27. 
Let us present the facts, as they are mentioned in the European Commission paper, and 
let us apply some analytical reasoning [presented in non-mathematical language] and 
the above quoted definition from the very European Commission paper. 
It is a well-known fact from cross-national social science aggregate data research, that 
simple percentage differences often lead to biased results, especially in situations like 
the one, when we compare poverty rates before and after social transfers over a very 
wide range countries, where initial before transfer poverty rates range from 17 to 30 
percent of total population, while after social transfer the range is from 10 to 23 percent 
(see Table 2). It is entirely possible that percentage point measured poverty reduction 
rates are a clear statistical function of initially very high before transfer poverty rates, 
i.e. it is much easier to reduce poverty at very high initial levels, while it is more 
difficult to have a good performance for the countries, characterized by initially low 
before taxation poverty rates. The countries are also performing differently in their 
objectives and in effectiveness in reducing the rate of poverty. The results in Table 
show that Sweden and Czech Republic are most effective and Greece and Latvia are 
least effective countries in social transfer and poverty reduction. 
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regression residuals (Eurostat figures, 2006) 
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Sweden 29  12  16,83  -4,83  4,83 
Czech Republic  22  10  14,73  -4,73  4,73 
Denmark 28  12  16,53  -4,53  4,53 
Netherlands 21  10  14,43  -4,43  4,43 
Finland 29  13  16,83  -3,83  3,83 
Slovenia 24  12  15,33  -3,33  3,33 
Germany 26  13  15,93  -2,93  2,93 
Austria 25  13  15,63  -2,63  2,63 
France 25  13  15,63  -2,63  2,63 
Slovakia 20  12  14,13  -2,13  2,13 
Luxembourg 24  14  15,33  -1,33  1,33 
Belgium 27  15  16,23  -1,23  1,23 
Hungary 30  16  17,13  -1,13  1,13 
Malta 22  14  14,73  -0,73  0,73 
Ireland 33  18  18,03  -0,03  0,03 
EU(25 countries)  26  16  15,93  0,07  -0,07 
EA13 25  16  15,63  0,37  -0,37 
Bulgaria 17  14  13,23  0,77  -0,77 
Cyprus 22  16  14,73  1,27  -1,27 
United Kingdom  30  19  17,13  1,87  -1,87 
Poland 29  19  16,83  2,17  -2,17 
Estonia 25  18  15,63  2,37  -2,37 
Portugal 25  18  15,63  2,37  -2,37 
Romania 24  19  15,33  3,67  -3,67 
Lithuania 27  20  16,23  3,77  -3,77 
Italy 24  20  15,33  4,67  -4,67 
Spain 24  20  15,33  4,67  -4,67 
Greece 23  21  15,03  5,97  -5,97 
Latvia 28  23  16,53  6,47  -6,47 
                                            
12 At the usual 60% of median income threshold. 
13 For a graphical presentation, see Graph 2 of this work 
14 Poverty is a negative phenomenon, thus the residuals had to be reversed. 
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Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003. The fourteen Lisbon indicators can be downloaded free of charge from 
the Eurostat website at:  
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page?_pageid=1133,47800773,1133_47802558&_dad=portal&_sc
hema=PORTAL. This site also informs about the “short list” of the indicators, on methodology, quality 
profiles etc. 
 
Graph 1 shows the data for column (1) and (2) on poverty before and after social 
transfer from the Table 2 in the form of a simple scatter-plot. The two poverty measures 
are positively correlated (0.30). The fit of the model is quite low and poverty before 
transfers explains only a small fraction (8.6%) of variations in poverty after social 
transfers. Several outliers cause the positive low relationships between the two 
measures.   
 
Graph 1: The real reduction of poverty risk  
Poverty before and after social transfers
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Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
Table 3 now shows the simple method, which was applied in the European Commission 
study, which did not use the latest available Eurostat figures, but some older Eurostat 
data, most probably used in order to provide a good time-match with the other data 
presented. The method reports the simple difference before and after which as expected 
is positive and a result of positive social transfers. However, it does not make any 
  23statistical association between before and after social transfer levels and neither it 
produces a metric measure linking the countries poverty reduction objectives and 
outcomes. The simple difference shows that Sweden, Finland and Denmark are most 
successful in their poverty reduction, while Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Spain are least 
successful countries.  
 
Table 3: The European Commission method to calculate the reduction of poverty (page 
36 of their study) 





European Commission method 
of calculating the change of 
poverty in %-points (% before 
minus % after social transfers) 
Austria 25  13  12 
Belgium 27  15  12 
Bulgaria 17  14  3 
Cyprus 22  16  6 
Czech Republic  22  10  12 
Denmark 28  12  16 
EA13 25  16  9 
Estonia 25  18  7 
EU (25 countries)  26  16  10 
Finland 29  13  16 
France 25  13  12 
Germany 26  13  13 
Greece 23  21  2 
Hungary 30  16  14 
Ireland 33  18  15 
Italy 24  20  4 
Latvia 28  23  5 
Lithuania 27  20  7 
Luxembourg 24  14 10 
Malta 22  14  8 
Netherlands 21  10  11 
Poland 29  19  10 
Portugal 25  18  7 
Romania 24  19  5 
Slovak Republic  20  12  8 
Slovenia 24  12  12 
Spain 24  20  4 
Sweden 29  12  17 
United Kingdom  30  19  11 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
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However, as we will show in Graph 2 of this paper, there is a systematic bias involved 
in this method. The graph shows the relationship between initial poverty before social 
transfers and the rate of poverty reduction. The simple regression results show that the 
“badies”, i.e. countries with terribly high before-transfer poverty rates, become the 
“goodies”. This is reflected in the high fit of the model or strong positive association 
between poverty before social transfer and the poverty reduction rate as a result of 
social transfers. 
 
Graph 2: Dependence between initial levels of before-taxation poverty rates and poverty 
reduction outcome, as measured by the EU-Commission. 
Initial poverty rates and poverty reduction (Commission method)

































Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
5. A COMPARISON OF OUR AND THE COMMISSIONS METHODOLOGY 
Our method of calculating the success of poverty reduction, by using the simple 
residuals from the linear regression is expressed as: 
(1)         i i i PRBT PRAT ε β α + + =  
where  PRBT is the poverty rates after transfers, PRBT is the rate before transfer, 
β α and  are unknown parameters to be estimated, ε  is the residual and the subscript i 
indicate the country. Graph 3, yields the following dependency of the results from initial 
before transfer poverty levels. As to be expected, our new method is far superior to the 
  25simplistic method, used by ECOFIN, and there is no correlation at all between initial 
levels of poverty and success in poverty reduction, as measured by the residuals 
method, presented in Table 2 and in Graph 1 of this paper.  
 
Graph 3: Dependency from initial before transfer poverty levels and policy outcome in 
form of poverty reduction rate. 
Initial before transfer poverty rates and poverty reduction - residuals method























































Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
Measuring poverty reduction in a very biased way and it will lead to results, which are 
in turn biased. We thus will use in our empirical estimates of the efficiency of social 
expenditures our own, unbiased estimates, and not the heavily biased methodology, 
used in the ECOFIN paper. Just as footnote we also say here that by using a simplistic 
methodology, the European Commission paper arrives at a Graph, which by the way 
contradicts much of their verbal argument, heavily in favour of a neo-liberal policy 
agenda of further liberalizing markets. In Graph 4 we report the European Commission 
approach of reduction of poverty risk. 
  26Graph 4: The European Commission version of the reduction of poverty risk, depending 



























































































Public social expenditure without old age and survivors pensions (% of GDP)
 
Source: European Commission paper, calculated on the base of Eurostat-EU-SILC, page 36 (there: Figure 
12: named “The relationship between social expenditures (without pension and survivors benefits) in % 
of GDP and the reduction of poverty risk”) 
 
This graph is of course reproducible with the empirical data, used in this paper. It shows 
the relationship between reductions in poverty risk and public social expenditure. The 
relations is as expected positive suggesting the higher the social spending, the higher is 
reduction in poverty risk. Table 4 reports the social expenditures as share of GDP and 
the reduction of poverty computed by the European Commission method as the 
difference between in poverty reduction before and after social spending. The social 
expenditure as share of GDP is highest in Sweden and France, while it is lowest in all 
three Baltic countries. Despite low level of social expenditures the later show significant 
reductions in their poverty rates. 
 
  27Table 4: Social expenditures and poverty reduction – the European Commission method 
  Social expenditures per 
GDP 
European Commission 
method of calculating the 
reduction of poverty in %-
points (% before minus % 
after social transfers) 
Austria 29,0  12 
Belgium 29,3  12 
Cyprus 17,8  6 
Czech Republic  19,3  12 
Denmark 30,9  16 
EA13 27,8  9 
Estonia 13,1  7 
EU25 27,3  10 
Finland 26,6  16 
France 31,3  12 
Germany 29,6  13 
Greece 23,6  2 
Hungary 20,7  14 
Ireland 18,2  15 
Italy 26,0  4 
Latvia 12,9  5 
Lithuania 13,3  7 
Luxembourg 22,3  10 
Malta 18,4  8 
Netherlands 28,3  11 
Poland 20,1  10 
Portugal 24,7  7 
Romania 15,1  5 
Slovak Republic  17,3  8 
Slovenia 23,7  12 
Spain 20,6  4 
Sweden 32,7  17 
United Kingdom  26,3  11 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003. 
 
The European Commission says in its paper that “the trade-off between efficiency and 
long-term financial sustainability of welfare systems and equality is not inevitable” 
(ECOFIN 2007, page 9). However, their own empirical method, updated by most recent 
Eurostat data, would suggest a heavy social-Keynesian reading of events. Graph 5 
shows the positive relationship between percentage poverty reduction and social 
expenditure share of GDP. The two variables are highly correlated (0.36) and social 
  28expenditure explains 28% of variations in the percentage poverty reduction among the 
countries. 
 
Graph 5: Social expenditures and poverty reduction relationships 
Social expenditures and poverty reduction



































Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
6. RELIABLE ESTIMATES OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL POLICY 
Let us now leave these measurement bias issues aside, and let us arrive at the real 
issues. First we present the statistical data as they really should be presented. The social 
expenditure share of GDP and percentage poverty better than expected after social 
transfers is reported for the sample countries in Table 5. The later is obtained as residual 
from regression of initial poverty on poverty after social transfer. 
 
  29Table 5: Social expenditures and poverty reduction – the “proper” results, based on the 
correct method of Table 2, and Graph 1 of this work 
  Social expenditures per 
GDP 
poverty situation after 
transfers better than expected 
(in % points) 
Austria 29,0  2,63 
Belgium 29,3  1,23 
Cyprus 17,8  -1,27 
Czech Republic  19,3  4,73 
Denmark 30,9  4,53 
EA13 27,8  -0,37 
Estonia 13,1  -2,37 
EU25 27,3  -0,07 
Finland 26,6  3,83 
France 31,3  2,63 
Germany 29,6  2,93 
Greece 23,6  -5,97 
Hungary 20,7  1,13 
Ireland 18,2  0,03 
Italy 26,0  -4,67 
Latvia 12,9  -6,47 
Lithuania 13,3  -3,77 
Luxembourg 22,3  1,33 
Malta 18,4  0,73 
Netherlands 28,3  4,43 
Poland 20,1  -2,17 
Portugal 24,7  -2,37 
Romania 15,1  -3,67 
Slovak Republic  17,3  2,13 
Slovenia 23,7  3,33 
Spain 20,6  -4,67 
Sweden 32,7  4,83 
UK 26,3  -1,87 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
  30The result from regression of social situation on social expenditure is reported in Graph 
6. This yields a graph, from which it is possible to draw the conclusion that the variance 
explained by social expenditures in poverty reduction is even greater than the one, 
which is implied by the European Commission methodology. For each percentage 
increase in social expenditure, the poverty rate declines by 0.32 percent. Social 
expenditure alone explains 30% of the variations in poverty rate. The reduction impact 
differs among the sample countries resulting in different effectiveness and gap between 
expected and observed poverty outcomes.  
 
Graph 6: Social expenditures and the social situation 
Social expenditures and social situation - better or worse than expected
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Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
According to our analysis reported in Table 6, the most efficient countries are the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, while the most inefficient trade-offs are to 
be encountered in Spain, Italy and Greece. France is serving as the reference group with 
perfect prediction. 
  31Table 6: The real efficiency of social expenditures in Europe 
Social 
expenditure















Czech R  19,3  4,73  -1,17  5,90 
Slovak R  17,3  2,13  -1,80  3,93 
Slovenia  23,7  3,33 0,22 3,11 
Netherlands  28,3  4,43 1,68 2,75 
Finland  26,6  3,83 1,14 2,69 
Malta 18,4  0,73  -1,45  2,18 
Denmark  30,9  4,53 2,50 2,03 
Hungary 20,7  1,13  -0,72  1,86 
Sweden  32,7  4,83 3,07 1,76 
Luxembourg 22,3  1,33  -0,22  1,55 
Ireland 18,2  0,03  -1,52  1,55 
Germany  29,6  2,93 2,09 0,84 
Estonia 13,1  -2,37  -3,13  0,76 
Austria  29,0  2,63 1,90 0,73 
Cyprus 17,8  -1,27  -1,64  0,37 
France  31,3  2,63 2,63 0,00 
Lithuania  13,3  -3,77 -3,07 -0,70 
Belgium 29,3  1,23  2,00  -0,76 
Romania  15,1  -3,67 -2,50 -1,17 
Poland  20,1  -2,17 -0,91 -1,25 
EU25 27,3  -0,07  1,36  -1,43 
EA13 27,8  -0,37  1,52  -1,89 
Portugal 24,7  -2,37  0,54  -2,91 
UK 26,3  -1,87  1,05  -2,92 
Latvia  12,9  -6,47 -3,19 -3,28 
Spain  20,6  -4,67 -0,76 -3,91 
Italy 26,0  -4,67  0,95  -5,62 
Greece 23,6  -5,97  0,19  -6,16 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
  327. THE CORRELATES OF THE EFFICIENCY OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 
Our correlations with the ECOFIN data imply that health care expenditures and family 
centred expenditures are very important predictors of an efficient poverty reduction, 
while large employer’s shares in social security financing are – under the conditions of 
European market economies, 2008, an important factor working against an efficient 
poverty reduction. The list of indicators of lifting people out of poverty and their 
poverty reduction effects is given in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Lifting people out poverty – the correlations 
Lifting people out of poverty. Correlation 
(Pearson Bravais) with "poverty situation 
better than expected" 
Health care, Sickness and disability % GDP  0,682 
Family with children % GDP  0,606 
Social expenditure  0,563 
Unemployment % GDP  0,440 
Housing and Social exclusion % GDP  0,438 
Protected persons' share  0,358 
Old age and survivors % of GDP  0,236 
General government contributions as % of 
financing of total social security contributions 
0,042 
Total social security contributions as % of total 
financing of social security contributions 
-0,017 
Other sources  -0,074 
Employers' share  -0,230 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
Similar tendencies emerge from our calculations about direct efficiency rates of social 
expenditures which are reported in Table 8. Centring social expenditures on family 
expenditures increases these efficiency rates, while especially generous pension systems 
are a good guarantee against an overall high efficiency rate of social expenditures. 
 
  33Table 8: The correlations of the efficiency of social policy 
Efficiency of social expenditures. 
Correlation (Pearson Bravais) with the 
residual measure, presented in Table 6 of 
this paper 
Family with Children % GDP  0,365 
Protected persons' share  0,225 
Health care/ Sickness and disability % GDP  0,207 
Housing and Social exclusion % GDP  0,170 
Total social security contributions as % of total 
financing of social sec contributions 
0,143 
Unemployment % GDP  0,049 
Employers' share  0,003 
Other sources  -0,066 
General government contributions as % of 
financing of total social sec contributions 
-0,128 
Old age and survivors % of GDP  -0,283 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
In the following, in Table 9, we will present an alternative approach, based on the factor 
analysis of the empirical ECOFIN and Eurostat data. Our SPSS XIV factor analysis was 
based on Eigenvalues 1, and on principal component analysis. The original data for the 
factor analysis are presented in Table 9. The typology table show presence of significant 
heterogeneity across countries by 9 indicators. Old age and survivors % of TB; the General 
government contributions as % of financing of total social sec contributions; Health care/ 
Sickness and disability % TB, and Employers' share are the highest contributors, while Housing 
and Social exclusion % TB; Unemployment % TB and other sources are the lowest contributors 
to poverty reduction. 
 















































Austria 10,7 33,5  1,4 48,4 6,0 33,0 37,9  27,3  1,4
Belgium 7,5 34,3  1,8 43,9 12,5 24,6 51,3  22,0  1,7
Cyprus 11,4 28,6  6,9 48,0 5,1 53,8 19,5  14,8  11,4
Czech R  8,6 43,3  3,2 41,2 3,7 18,0 54,5  26,5  1,1
Denmark 13,0 34,3 6,0 37,3 9,3 63,3 10,2  18,4 7,9
EA13 8,3 35,5  2,6 46,4 7,2 33,8 40,1  22,6  3,5
Estonia 12,4 41,1  1,6 44,2 1,6 20,3 79,7  0,8  0,0
EU25 8,0 36,1  3,4 45,6 6,5 37,6 38,3  20,6  3,5
Finland 11,6 38,8  3,1 36,8 9,7 43,6 38,9  11,5  6,1
France 8,5 35,7  4,4 43,5 7,8 30,6 44,8  21,0  3,9
Germany 10,9 35,1 2,5 43,5 8,4 35,8 35,1  27,8 1,7
Greece 7,0 31,4  4,8 51,1 6,1 30,8 35,6  22,8  10,8
Hungary 12,3 39,9 2,5 42,4 3,0 34,6 42,1  15,9 7,5
Ireland 14,7 45,3  5,3 27,1 7,6 54,1 24,7  15,5  6,2
Italy 4,4 32,3  0,4 61,0 2,0 41,4 41,8  15,3  1,5
Latvia 10,6 34,1  1,6 49,6 3,3 35,3 47,4  16,5  0,8
Lithuania 8,5 39,5  2,3 47,3 1,6 39,9 53,8  6,3  0,7
Luxembourg 17,4 38,8  2,7 36,5 4,6 45,3 26,7  24,6  3,4
Malta 4,9 33,5  3,3 50,5 7,7 34,2 43,5  19,0  2,7
Netherlands 4,9 41,3  6,1 42,0 6,1 19,8 33,4 34,3 12,2
Poland 4,6 31,0  1,5 59,4 3,6 39,2 27,9  22,5  10,3
Romania 10,1 43,2 4,1 38,5 3,4 11,8 50,0  23,5  14,7
Slovak R  10,8 38,9  3,0 41,3 6,0 14,3 61,9  22,6  1,8
Slovenia 8,6 40,5  3,0 44,8 3,0 31,8 27,5  39,8  0,8
Spain 5,4 38,1  1,5 42,1 12,4 33,3 49,1  15,8  2,3
Sweden 9,8 40,0  3,8 40,3 6,3 48 41,1  8,7  2,2
UK 6,6 39,5  6,2 44,6 2,7 50,6 32,5  15,5  1,5
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software 
Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003 
 
  358. ON THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL  
In the literature we find both of quantitative and qualitative methods to measure 
outcomes of activities. One can also distinguish among parametric and non-parametric 
approaches. Each method they have their benefits and limitations. Outcomes are often 
multidimensional and are represented by multiple indicators with both positive and 
negative effects on the outcomes. However, our objective here is not to evaluate effects 
of certain policy programs, but rather to quantify the state of an object to be studied. 
The multidimensionality of outcomes requires the creation of composite indices to have 
a single measure and to be able to aggregate identifiable relevant indicators in a 
satisfactory way. Here the focus is on the construction of an index that is 
multidimensional and decomposable to use it in describing the social policy process in 
European Community. Such an index will be a useful tool in the evaluation of the 
outcome of the member countries efforts, the policy impacts on development in the 
region and in the quantification of the progress in achieving the Unions stated goals. In 
this section, we introduce a parametric approach to compute composite indices 
frequently used in the evaluation of outcomes of policies and for the ranking of 
countries based on their performance. 
The literature on index numbers is diverse and volumes. These are the principal 
component (PC) analysis and factor analysis (FA) which can be also used in the 
computation of an index for the social policy process.
15 The basic idea with these 
methods is to combine several variables into a smaller set of independent variables 
without loosing the essential information from the original data. Thus, the issue first 
was how to combine different indicators related to the Lisbon process into a single 
measure of its progress. In this study, we adopt the factor analysis approach. Since the 
two methods in normalized form give principal component scores with unit variance, 
we use only the factor analysis results in the analysis of the social policy process.  
Factor analysis is a multivariate technique for examining relationships within a set of 
interrelated quantitative variables or a common factor. The common factors are not 
observable and assumed by construction to be independent from each other. The 
explanatory variables or indicators, which are linearly related to each other, are 
combined within a single common factor. The correlation between the explanatory 
variables is explained by the common factors, while the remaining variance of a 
variable is attributed to a unique factor. The factors are derived in such a way that each 
maximizes the percentage of total variance attributed to each of the successive factors. 
The greater the variance share of the variables explained by the common factors, the 
better is the fit of the factor model and the more accurate is the composite index and the 
rank of countries.  
Given a dataset with j numeric variables or indicators, at most p factor components can 
be computed, each being a linear combination of the original indicators with 
coefficients equal to the eigenvectors of the correlation of the covariance matrix. 
Mathematically the factor model is written as:
16
                                            
15 For recent surveys on the literature on the use of composite indices in different development research context see 
also Archibugi and Coco (2004), Grupp and Mogee (2004), Heshmati (2003), Andersen and Herbertsson (2003) and 
Nasierowoski (2007). 
16 See also Andersen and Herbertsson (2003). 
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where  is a jxn matrix of the measure of the centred variable j for country i in period 
t,  is the pxj matrix of the value of the common factors for each country estimated, 
the coefficients are a matrix of jxp weights called factor loadings, representing 
weights attached to the explanatory variables and are in proportion of the cross-country 
variance of the variable that is explained by the factor,  is jxn matrix of the unique 






The estimated factor scores can be used to rank the countries according to the respective 
factors. In our case, the factor scores are used to rank the countries with respect to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of social spending, i.e. a relative measure of the member 
countries progress in social policy. The factor components are sorted according to the 
descending order of the Eigenvalue, which are equal to the variance of the components. 
Unlike in a traditional least squares estimation method case, where the vertical distance 
to the fitted line is minimized, here the sum of the squared residuals is measured as 
distances from the point to the first principal axis.  
The method of principal component analysis was originated by Pearson (1901) and 
further developed by Hotelling (1933). The method of composite indices, as we already 
stated, has been employed in many areas including the computation of an environmental 
index (Kang, 2002), in the computation of a simple globalization index using trade and 
financial openness (Agénor, 2003), in computation of composite index of innovation 
system (Katz, 2006), in computation of technology assessment index (Arcelus, Sharma 
and Sirinivasan, 2005), in assessment of innovations (Nasierowski, 2007) and in 
evaluation of economic and social indicators of global competitiveness (Mirchandani, 
1999), in analysis of world competitiveness (WCY, 2006), and others. Tausch, 
Heshmati and Oh (2007) and Heshmati and Oh (2007) used the method for the 
computation of the social policy indices. 
As shown above, the composite indices are found useful in a variety of economic 
performance and social policy areas. Despite their attractiveness, they are subject to 
several methodological problems (Saisana and Tranatola, 2002; Nasierowski, 2007; 
Mirchandani, 2005; and Lockwood, 2004). These include the possibility of 
manipulation to produce desired outcomes, missing data, weighting and aggregation of 
indicators, producing similar ranking regardless of intensions of the computation 
exercise. Hair et al. (2006) provide a four step procedure to compute an index including: 
(i) to scan the anti-image correlation matrix, (ii) elimination of indicators based on the 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olin sample adequacy, (iii) conditions for extraction of indicators with 
desirable properties, and guidance for interpretation of the results. In this paper by using 
a parametric approach we are able to avoid several of the problems mentioned above. 
 
  379. THE FACTOR ANALYSIS RESULTS  
Result from factor analysis based on the ECOFIN data is reported in Table 10. Four 
types of social policy model including direct action against social exclusion (Denmark 
and Ireland), emphasis on health and family social expenditures (Estonia and Ireland), 
Neo-liberal approach (Netherlands and Romania) and Unemployment benefit centred 
approach (Belgium and Spain) are distinguished. The factor loadings values of a set of 
social policy indicators and their contributions to each type pf social policy model are 
also reported. 
  
Table 10: A factor analysis of the ECOFIN data 






















Family/Children % TB  VAR02  0,485  0,574  -0,319  -0,053 
Health care/ Sickness and 
disability % TB 
VAR03 0,099  0,859  0,27  -0,153 
Housing and Social 
exclusion % TB 
VAR04 0,785 -0,057 0,224 -0,256 
Old age and survivors % 
of TB 
VAR05 -0,615 -0,752 -0,097 -0,209 
Unemployment % TB  VAR06  0,300  -0,062  0,068  0,889 
General government 
contributions as % of 
financing of total social 
sec contributions 
VAR07 0,615  -0,29 -0,688 -0,006 
Employers'  share  VAR08  -0,784 0,513 0,039 -0,014 
Protected persons' share  VAR09  0,123  -0,256  0,752  0,215 
Other  sources  VAR10 0,516 -0,293 0,451 -0,363 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS 
XIV, implemented at Innsbruck University 
 
These factors yielded the following empirical typology of welfare states in Europe 
shown in Table 11. The table guide us to the identification of countries with best 
practice social policy models, their types as well as their rank in relation to the 
remaining countries in the sample. The ratio of a country’s score to the best practice, not 
reported here, indicates the degree of efficiency in its welfare policy. The country with 
the highest score serves as frontier, reference or the benchmark model. The gap or 
distance to the frontier country also suggests potential for reduction in poverty by using 
the frontier country’s social policies.  
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Type 2: EST, 
IRE, health and 
family soc 
expenditures 








Austria -0,5220 -0,4440 -0,1230  0,7264
Belgium -0,6890 -0,0820 0,3331  2,4016
Cyprus 1,6257 -1,6020 -0,7600  -1,1840
Czech Republic  -0,7350 1,1610 1,1587  -0,2360
Denmark 2,3773 -0,5940 -0,9330  0,5151
EA13 -0,2740 -0,3500 0,1049  0,6284
Estonia -1,7060 1,9824 -1,1200  -1,2020
EU25 -0,0440 -0,3240 -0,0500  0,2901
Finland 0,7351 0,6589 -0,6670  0,8623
France 0,0303 -0,0720 0,3550  0,5411
Germany 0,0925 -0,1560 0,0595  1,2889
Greece 0,1881 -1,4090 0,7957  -0,5070
Hungary 0,0812 0,6511 -0,1580  -1,0590
Ireland 2,1547 1,6106 -0,4920  0,1008
Italy -1,6570 -1,5330 -1,0700  -0,7270
Latvia -0,8850 -0,1150 -0,9100  -0,2980
Lithuania -0,9350 0,5675 -1,2770  -1,1790
Luxembourg 1,0599 0,8831 -0,6320  0,0079
Malta -0,6140 -0,9210 -0,0150  0,6446
Netherlands 0,6758 -0,3150 2,7985  -0,5590
Poland -0,6250 -2,2030 0,1454  -0,8720
Romania 0,2034 0,9916 2,1827  -1,5230
Slovak Republic  -0,8170 1,0988 0,7932  0,3646
Slovenia -0,0390 -0,0860 1,2184  -0,0410
Spain -0,5670 0,1466 -0,0410  2,1732
Sweden 0,3479 0,6251 -1,1350  -0,0180
UK 0,5385 -0,1690 -0,5630  -1,1410
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS 
XIV, implemented at Innsbruck University 
  39Model 1: Direct action against social exclusion 
The Map 1 shows the rank of countries in respect with the Type 1 welfare model, 
namely, direct action against social exclusion, where Denmark and Ireland are the 
frontier countries. Here the expenditure on housing is the main indicator or social policy 
measure. The distribution of efficiency differs much across the countries. 
 
Map 1: direct action against social exclusion 
against social exclusion
0,74 bis  2,38  (3)
0,19 bis  0,74  (5)
-0,52 bis  0,19  (5)
-0,73 bis -0,52  (5)
-1,71 bis -0,73  (6)
Expend. housing &
 
Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Source: Our own calculations from 
ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS XIV, implemented at Innsbruck 
University. “Bis” is shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 2 of this article 
 
The factor analysis results related to welfare Model 1 are found in Table 10. The model 
combines very high expenditures on housing for the fight against social exclusion, and a 
very high government contribution towards the financing of the social policy model. 
The model has a very low share of employer’s contribution in the financing of the 
model, and pension expenditures are a smaller part of total benefits. Most typically to be 
found is: Denmark and Ireland; least realization of the model: Baltic States, Czech 




  40Model 2: Health and family approach 
The Map 2 shows the rank of countries in respect with the Type 2 welfare model, 
labelled as health and family approach, where Estonia and Ireland are serving as the 
frontier countries. Here the expenditure on health care, sickness and disability are the 
main indicators or social policy measures. The distribution of efficiency differs much 
across the countries.  
 
Map 2: Health and family soc expenditures 
1,1  bis  1,99  (3)
0,63 bis  1,1   (5)
-0,09 bis  0,63  (6)
-0,44 bis -0,09  (4)
-2,21 bis -0,44  (6)
Health + family approach
Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Source: Our own calculations from 
ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS XIV, implemented at Innsbruck 
University. “Bis” is shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 2 of this article 
 
The factor analysis results related to welfare Model 2 are found in Table 10. The model 
combines very high expenditures on family and children, and on health, sickness and 
disability. Pension expenditures are a smaller part of total benefits. Most typically to be 
found: Estonia and Ireland; Czech Republic. Least to be found: Italy, Poland, Greece. 
Trade-off with the effectiveness of poverty reduction: not significant, but positive 
 
 
  41Model 3: Neo-liberal approach 
The Map 3 shows the rank of countries in respect with the Type 3 welfare model, called 
neo-liberal approach to welfare. Here Netherlands and Romania are identified as the 
frontier countries. The protected person’s share or contributors pay more are the main 
indicators or social policy measures. The distribution of efficiency differs much across 
the countries and to the first 2 welfare models.  
 
Map 3: Neo-liberal approach: contributors pay 
1,16 bis  2,8   (3)
0,15 bis  1,16  (5)
-0,16 bis  0,15  (6)
-0,91 bis -0,16  (4)
-1,28 bis -0,91  (6)
Contributors pay more
 
Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Source: Our own calculations from 
ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS XIV, implemented at Innsbruck 
University. “Bis” is shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 2 of this article 
 
The factor analysis results related to welfare Model 3 are found in Table 10. The Model 
3 combines very high contributions by the insured persons and very low contributions 
by the state. Most typically to be found: Netherlands and Romania. Least to be found: 
Baltic States, Sweden, Italy. Trade-off with the effectiveness of poverty reduction: not 
significant, but positive 
 
 
  42Model 4: Unemployment benefit centred approach 
The Map 4 shows the rank of countries in respect with the Type 4 welfare model, called 
unemployment benefit centred approach to welfare. Belgium and Spain are identified as 
the frontier countries with best practiced welfare system. The unemployment benefit is 
the main indicator or social policy measure. The distribution of efficiency differs much 
across the countries and to the first 3 welfare models.  
 
Map 4: unemployment benefit centred approach 
centered approach
0,86 bis  2,41  (4)
0,36 bis  0,86  (5)
-0,24 bis  0,36  (5)
-0,87 bis -0,24  (4)
-1,53 bis -0,87  (6)
unemployment benefit
Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Source: our own calculations from 
ECFIN/E3 (2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS XIV, implemented at Innsbruck 
University. “Bis” is shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 2 of this article 
 
The factor analysis results related to welfare Model 4 are found in Table 10. The model 
is based on a very high share of unemployment benefits per total benefits. Most 
typically to be found: Spain and Belgium, Germany and Finland. Least to be found: UK, 
Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Hungary, Romania. Trade-off with the effectiveness of 
poverty reduction: significant and positive. 
We also applied standard multiple regression analysis to analyze the effects of the four 
types of social expenditure and social welfare regimes in Europe on poverty reduction, 
as defined in Table 2. The multiple regression results are reported in Table 12. 
  43 
Table 12: Multiple regression with the efficiency of poverty reduction 
Predictor Empirical 
measurement 














Type 1: DK IRE, direct 
action against social 
exclusion 
REGR factor 
score   1 for 
analysis 1 
1,245 0,6  0,362  2,074  0,05 
Type 2: EST, IRE, health and 
family soc expenditures 
REGR factor 
score   2 for 
analysis 1 
0,800 0,6  0,233  1,333  0,196 
Type 3: NL, RO neo-liberal 
approach 
REGR factor 
score   3 for 
analysis 1 
0,729 0,6  0,212  1,215  0,237 




score   4 for 
analysis 1 
1,089 0,6  0,317  1,814  0,083 
Source: Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Calculated by SPSS 
XIV, implemented at Innsbruck University. Adjusted R^2 = 0,208; F = 2,711; error probability of the 
entire equation = 5.6%, df = 26 
 
Our regression results indicate the significant positive effects of Model 1 and Model 4 
on poverty reduction. This suggests that action against social exclusion and 
unemployment benefits are most effective measures in poverty reduction.  
 
10. CONCLUSIONS 
The neo-liberal agenda, emerging from the recent European Commission ECOFIN 
paper, which we discussed at length in this essay, maintains that EU-27 governments 
should, inter alia: 
•  Redirect rather than increase public expenditures.  
•  Make revisions in the pension systems and in the unemployment benefit 
schemes, which should be implemented in parallel. 
•  Governments should be encouraging people to work longer and be more active 
in order to cope with the social, economic, fiscal and other challenges posed by 
ageing populations.  
•  "Making work pay" through appropriate incentives so that tax/benefit systems 
do not hinder labour market dynamics and actually it help to facilitate structural 
changes.  
•  Governments should be pursuing further the ongoing efforts to improve cost-
effectiveness and long term financial sustainability of health care  
•  Governments should evaluate and screen regularly the efficiency of social 
policies, with a strong emphasis on value for money.  
  44For Aiginger (2008), by contrast, the European model is no barrier to competitiveness, 
if it is reformed in the direction of fostering change and growth, improving incentives 
and qualifications. The Scandinavian countries, which now combine rapid growth, full 
employment with a comprehensive welfare system and a high priority for ecological 
concerns and fairness, show the way. While for Aiginger and associates (2007) the 
differences with regard to growth dynamics had been very small in the decades after 
World War II (1960-1990), growth rates as well as the employment and social policy 
records have diverged over the past 15 years. The best performances are: the 
Scandinavian model and the liberal Anglo-Saxon model, while the continental model 
produced low growth and increasing unemployment. The reforms primarily in the 
Scandinavian countries allow Aiginger and associates to delineate elements of a “New 
Welfare State Architecture” which on the one hand upholds important characteristics of 
a European social model, but on the other hand allows welfare states to be competitive 
in the globalising economy. For Tausch, Heshmati, Balajan (2007) the fourteen “kernel 
Lisbon indicators” go indeed hand in hand with high comparative price levels; high 
freight transport; high greenhouse gas emissions; low business investment rates; and 
low youth educational attainment rates. The authors conclude that in reality we are 
facing four underlying and contradictory processes including: a Lisbon productivity 
factor; high eco-social exclusion; the employment performance; and the neo-liberal 
European model. 
 
Map 5: Good/bad poverty reduction policies in Europe 
analysis of Eurostat residuals
poverty before/after transfers
3,8 bis  4,9  (5)
2,1 bis  3,8  (5)
0  bis  2,1  (5)
-2,4 bis  0   (5)
-6,5 bis -2,4  (6)
good poverty reduction
 
  45Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 
(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003. “Bis” is 
shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 2 of this article 
 
The evidence, surveyed in this article, suggests that in terms of the efficiency of the 
European social model there is the following geography (Map 5) of comparative 
European performance in place, which again underlines the importance of the Aiginger 
analysis about the importance of the “model Scandinavia”: 
 
Applying rigorous state-of-the-art cross-national comparative social science 
methodology, we also arrive at the conclusion that in terms of the initial ECOFIN 
definition of efficiency, the data presented in this article suggest that apart from Finland 
and the Netherlands, three new EU-27 member countries, the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia
17, provide interesting answers to the old and troubling question about the 
“bang” and the “buck”
18 (see Map 6). 
Italy, Spain and Greece in each case are among the worst performing countries in 
Europe. The mediocre performance of the often hailed best practice model of the United 
Kingdom
19 on all accounts of this study should be also taken into account: 
                                            
17 The point about the depth of Roma poverty in the East and Muslim poverty in the West, made by Clesse in his 
article (2008) must again be underlined: we have reason to think that standard Eurostat poverty indicators do not 
capture sufficiently the extent of poverty, especially Roma poverty, in many new member countries of the EU-27, 
and Muslim “banlieue”-poverty in the old EU-27 member countries. A more adequate indicator would be UNDP 
data series on the percentage of people not surviving age 65. Here, especially, the often hailed social policies of the 
United Kingdom have to be put into a relative perspective: female probability at birth of surviving to age 65 is just 
rank 29 in world society (global leaders are Japan, Hongkong, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Iceland, Israel, Sweden, 
Cyprus and Australia), and Slovakia is rank 40; Bulgaria 50 and Romania rank 59 of all countries of the world. Male 
probability at birth of surviving to age 65 in the UK is just rank 21 in world society, (global leaders are Iceland, 
Sweden, Hongkong, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, Cyprus, Malta, Israel, and United Arab Emirates). The depth and 
tragedy of Roma poverty again is reflected in these figures: Slovakia is rank 75; Bulgaria 76 and Romania rank 86 of 
all countries of the world.  
18 In the Cold War, this terminology was applied to the military gains from the continued nuclear arms race. In June 
1998, the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank, published "Atomic Audit: The Costs and 
Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940." According to "Atomic Audit," since 1940 the United States has 
spent at least $5,481,083,000,000 -- that's nearly $5.5 trillion -- in constant 1996 dollars on its nuclear weapons and 
weapons-related programs. The figure does not include an estimated $320 billion for future and some present costs 
for the storage and disposal of nuclear wastes and weapons. Distributed evenly to everyone in the United States, the 
cost of nuclear weapons comes to $21,646 per person. Represented as a brick of new $1 bills (such as the type 
available in banks, with $200 per inch), the stack of bills spent for nuclear weapons would stretch to the moon and 
nearly back to Earth. Laid end-to-end, those bricks of $1 bills would encircle the Earth at the equator more than 100 
times, building a wall nearly nine feet high. Stephen Schwartz, the director of the U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study 
Project, notes that the United States still spends about $35 billion each year -- more than $96 million a day -- on its 
nuclear arsenal and related programs. He cites as an example an effort by the U.S. Air Force and Atomic Energy 
Commission, between 1946 and 1961, to create a nuclear-powered aircraft. According to "Atomic Audit," the failed 
program cost more than $7 billion before it was cancelled by President Kennedy. "You want to make sure you really 
are getting a bigger bang for the buck," says Schwartz. "As a result of our work, we found a lot of programs that 
contributed absolutely nothing to the effort." (see 
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/experience/the.bomb/atomic.audit/).  
19 For a forceful critique of the neo-liberal vision of Europe see also Clesse, 2008. 
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Map 6: The social “bang” for the social expenditure “buck” 
efficiency analysis based on
Eurostat/ECOFIN data (residuals)
2,2 bis  5,9  (5)
1,5 bis  2,2  (6)
-0,7 bis  1,5  (4)
-1,3 bis -0,7  (4)
-6,2 bis -1,3  (6)
"Bang" for social "buck"
 
Legend: calculations see text. Green colour: no available data. Our own calculations from ECFIN/E3 
(2007)/REP/50604 and Eurostat data. Computer Software Microsoft EXCEL 2000 and 2003. “Bis” is 
shorthand for: ranging from … to. Based on Table 6 of this article. 
 
We also could show in this paper, that the direct action against social exclusion, as best 
evidenced by the cases of Denmark and Ireland, combines very high expenditures on 
housing and for the fight against social exclusion, and a very high government 
contribution towards the financing of the social policy model. The model has a very low 
share of employer’s contribution in the financing of the model, and pension 
expenditures are a smaller part of total benefits. The trade-off with the effectiveness of 
poverty reduction is significant. 
Health and family social expenditures, typically present in Estonia and Ireland, combine 
very high expenditures on family and children, and on health, sickness and disability. 
Pension expenditures are a smaller part of total benefits. The trade-off with the 
effectiveness of poverty reduction is not significant, but positive. 
The neo-liberal approach, which means in effect that contributors, not the governments 
pay for the social system, is well present today in the Netherlands and in Romania. The 
model combines very high contributions by the insured persons and very low 
  47contributions by the state. The trade-off with the effectiveness of poverty reduction: is 
not significant, but positive. 
There is a fourth model being practiced in Europe – it is the unemployment benefit 
centred approach. Belgium and Spain are the model countries. The model is based on a 
very high share of unemployment benefits per total benefits. The trade-off with the 
effectiveness of poverty reduction is significant at the 10% error level and positive. 
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